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Abstract 
We propose that measures of information integration can be more 
straightforwardly interpreted as measures of agency rather than of 
consciousness. This may be useful to the goals of consciousness 
research, given how agency and consciousness are “duals” in many 
(though not all) respects. 
Once consciousness is analysed as efficient network activity, it is manifested across a 
broad range of systems, and its meaningfulness as a concept becomes diluted. That is, 
as Merker et al. successfully show, a fundamental challenge for the integrated 
information theory of consciousness (Tononi 2008; Tononi et al. 2016). 
In this commentary we propose that measures of information integration can 
most directly be interpreted as measures of agency rather than of consciousness. As 
we will argue, since agency can be defined in terms of behavioural patterns, it avoids 
the problems arising from quantifying “first-person perspective” properties by means 
of “third-person perspective” measures. As the conceptual dual of consciousness, 
agency may deserve a more prominent place in consciousness research. 
Agency and Integration. Agency is increasingly of interest to biologists, as many 
developmental patterns and behaviors (including those of plants) are characterized in 
agential terms. It is part of a trend to assign a greater theoretical role to organisms as 
such in our understanding of evolution: organisms not as passive targets of 
evolutionary processes as actively shaping their selective environment (Laland, 
Matthews, and Feldman 2016) and respond in a goal-directed manner to opportunities 
or “affordances” in their environment (Walsh 2015). At a very general level, “agency” 
refers to how organisms exhibit goal-directed behaviours in response to 
environmental change. 
Talking about goals in this way activates old worries about teleology and 
anthropomorphism (i.e., agency as human-like intentionality). However, in practise, 
the pay-off involved in explaining behaviors as goal-directed is that this helps account 
for patterns of behavioral robustness: an organism’s “goal” is what it attempts to 
achieve through various means, even when it is perturbed or challenged by an 
environmental change. In other words, agency refers to how a (1) small number of 
goals can account for patterns of connectivity between (2) a large number of possible 
environmental states, and (3) a large number of possible behaviors.  
This explanatory structure describes a bow-tie architecture (see figure). 
environmental states and behaviors are integrated in virtue of the presence of “goals”. 
Agency can be manifested in different ways, and the figure does not illustrate any fine-
grained connections between environmental states and behaviors. What it does 
illustrate is the explanatory general structure, where the “goals” are used to explain 
how environmental states and behaviors are informationally integrated (for an 




When the issue is put in this way, suggestive parallels with theories of 
consciousness emerge. Not just the IIT posits consciousness as the integration of 
various experiential properties (Tononi 2008), but also global workspace theory 
(Dehaene and Changeux 2011, 11) posits a similar structure, where consciousness is a 
global broadcast mechanism, integrating input and output systems. 
Unlike theories of consciousness, a theory of agency does not need further 
justification of why such bow-tie architectures should be identified with agency. Goal-
directedness is a third-person concept and in this way it can be unproblematically 
goals possible behaviorspossible environmental states
fleshed out in terms of input-output patterns. Agency as a concept just is a type pattern 
of connectivity between environmental states and behaviors. There is no need to posit 
a counterpart to “qualia” or some ineffable subjective quality.  
The underlying reason for this is that agency is an explanatory concept rather 
than one with a reference to an empirical state-of-affairs. Informally, agency could be 
said to be more like “Newton’s law of inertia” rather than to “white snow”. If one is 
habituated to thinking of agency in terms of intentionality (or the presence of some 
form of mentality), this view of agency may require a gestalt-switch. The concept of 
agency imposes a structure on observed behavior, and if the observed behavioral 
patterns do not exhibit this general structure, there is simply no need to describe them 
as “agential” (see discussion in Desmond and Huneman 2020). 
   
Agency and Consciousness as Duals. Whether or not the apparent isomorphism 
between theories of consciousness and the structure of agency is more than skin-deep 
is not something we can analyse in detail here. Instead, we offer a general rationale 
why the apparent isomorphism might be genuine: agency and consciousness can, at a 
fundamental level, be viewed as “duals”. In mathematics, dual concepts are used to 
integrate two different ways of looking at a same object (cf. e.g. Atiyah 2007). 
Similarly, if agency refers to the activity of the organism in relation to the environment, 
consciousness in its broadest sense denotes the “passivity” of the organism. A synonym 
for consciousness – sentience – makes this passivity clearer: the capacity of “feeling” 
refers to how an organism “undergoes” its environment (or think of “e-motion”: being 
moved). The duality follows from the fact that one cannot have activity without 
passivity, and vice versa: both are dimensions of an underlying organism-environment 
relationality.  
Given this duality, it is not surprising that greater motor sensori-motor control 
has evolved in tandem with various proxies of consciousness such as cognitive systems 
(van Duijn, Keijzer, and Franken 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2020). Just as invoking the 
dual operator in mathematics may help solve otherwise intractable problems, 
understanding the evolution of agency may help understanding the evolution of 
consciousness. 
Another major worry for consciousness research is the spectre of panpsychism 
– seemingly the unavoidable cost of naturalising and/or de-anthropomorphizing 
consciousness. In context of agency, the dual spectre would be that of 
“panagentialism”. In other contexts, this has been called hyper-agency detection: 
seeing agency everywhere (cf. (Atran 2002). However, panagentialism can be more 
easily defused, because of an asymmetry between agency and consciousness (at least 
as the latter is typically understood). Attributing agency is an explanatory strategy to 
make sense of behavioral complexity. Hence, explaining all behaviors as agential is not 
a statement about reality (as panpsychism is typically interpreted to be), but simply as 
a (poor) explanatory practise. In other words, it reflects methodological issues rather 
than facts of the matter. However, perhaps there are indeed “no facts of the matter” 
regarding consciousness (Carruthers 2020). In that case, agency and consciousness 




Atiyah, Michael. 2007. “Duality in Mathematics and Physics.” Transcription of a talk 
delivered at the Institut de Matemàtica de la Universitat de Barcelona. 
https://fme.upc.edu/ca/arxius/butlleti-
digital/riemann/071218_conferencia_atiyah-d_article.pdf. 
Atran, Scott. 2002. In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Carruthers, Peter. 2020. “Stop Caring about Consciousness.” Philosophical Topics. 
Dehaene, Stanislas, and Jean-Pierre Changeux. 2011. “Experimental and Theoretical 
Approaches to Conscious Processing.” Neuron 70 (2): 200–227. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018. 
Desmond, Hugh. 2019. “Shades of Grey: Granularity, Pragmatics, and Non-Causal 
Explanation.” Perspectives on Science 27 (1): 68–87. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00300. 
Desmond, Hugh, and Philippe Huneman. 2020. “The Ontology of Organismic 
Agency: A Kantian Approach.” In Natural Born Monads: On the Metaphysics 
of Organisms and Human Individuals., edited by Andrea Altobrando and 
Pierfrancesco Biasetti. Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Duijn, Marc van, Fred Keijzer, and Daan Franken. 2006. “Principles of Minimal 
Cognition: Casting Cognition as Sensorimotor Coordination.” Adaptive 
Behavior 14 (2): 157–70. https://doi.org/10.1177/105971230601400207. 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2020. “Varieties of Subjectivity.” Philosophy of Science 87 (5): 
1150–59. https://doi.org/10.1086/710541. 
Laland, Kevin, Blake Matthews, and Marcus W. Feldman. 2016. “An Introduction to 
Niche Construction Theory.” Evolutionary Ecology 30: 191–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10682-016-9821-z. 
Rickles, Dean. 2017. “Dual Theories: ‘Same but Different’ or ‘Different but Same’?” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics 59 (August): 62–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.09.005. 
Tononi, Giulio. 2008. “Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional 
Manifesto.” The Biological Bulletin 215 (3): 216–42. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/25470707. 
Tononi, Giulio, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, and Christof Koch. 2016. 
“Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to Its Physical 
Substrate.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17 (7): 450–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2016.44. 
Walsh, Denis. 2015. Organisms, Agency, and Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316402719. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
